International risk sharing and low cross-country consumption correlations: are they really inconsistent? by Michael R. Pakko
WORKING PAPER SERIES
International Risk Sharing and Low Cross-Country Consumption




PUBLISHED: Review of International Economics, 
August 1997.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
Research Division
411 Locust Street
St. Louis, MO 63102
______________________________________________________________________________________
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be
cleared with the author or authors.
Photo courtesy of The Gateway Arch, St. Louis, MO.   www.gatewayarch.comINTERNATIONAL RISK SHARING AND LOW CROSS-COUNTRY
CONSUMPTION CORRELATIONS: ARE THEY REALLY
INCONSISTENT?
ABSTRACT
In dynamic equilibrium trade models, the common assumption that asset markets arecomplete
implies that correlations ofconsumption across countries should be quite high. In contrast,
measured consumption correlations tend to be ratherlow. While some suggest this implies
that asset market incompleteness is a fundamental feature determining international trade
dynamics, this paperprovides an example ofa simple model economy in which complete
markets can be associated with consumption correlations that are lower than output
correlations. Conditions for substitution elasticities associated with this result are derived for a
two-country, two-good endowment model with heterogeneous agents.
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1. Introduction
In equilibrium models ofinternational trade dynamics, it is commonly assumed that asset markets
are completein the Arrow-Debreu sense. This feature seems more realistic thanthe alternative
extreme ofno international asset trade, and it provides a tractable framework in which
decentralized equilibrium solutions canbe foundby determining Pareto optimal allocations. For a
wide varietyofpreference and technology specifications, however, thepooling ofconsumption
risk provided by complete asset marketsimplies avery high cross-country consumption
correlation -- much higher than hasbeen found empirically.
In particular, measured consumption correlations tend to be lower thancorresponding
output correlations. Table 1 illustrates this relationship, comparing various countries’
consumption and output correlationswith theU.S. (replicating the evidence presented by Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland 1992b, 1993).’ In contrast to this observed empirical regularity,models that
assume complete asset markets oftenpredict consumption correlations which are nearlyperfect,
regardless ofthecorrelations between outputs. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992b) called this
implication “themost striking discrepancy”...“between theory and data.”
Intwo-country, one-sectormodels ofinternational trade dynamics -- such as those of
Cantorand Mark (1988), Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (l992b), Baxter and Crucini (1993) --
trade is motivated solely by risk pooling. Hence it is not too surprising that suchmodels imply a
high correlationofconsumption acrosscountries. Similarly, in two good models in which agents
have identical preferences, the existence ofa “perfectlypooled equilibrium” (Lucas, 1982) implies
perfect correlation ofconsumption across countries.
—1—Severalpapers have addressed this issue. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland(1992b)
incorporate avariety offeatures, including non-timeseparable leisure preferences, time-to-build,
and trading frictions, with little effect onthemagnitude oftheconsumption correlation.
Devereux, Gregoryand Smith (1992) showed that substitutability between consumption and
leisurecould reducetheoretically generated cross-country consumption correlations; however,
theirresults depended crucially on a particularpreference specification, and their simulated
consumption correlations were not compared to output correlations.
Kollmann (1990) and Baxter and Crucini (1992) havesuggested that asset-market
incompleteness might account forthe low correlationofconsumption across countries. Ifagents
have limited opportunities to pool risk, national consumption levels are tied more closelyto
domestic outputthanto worldoutput, so cross-country consumption correlations tend to be
lower.
Inthis paper, I examinewhether it is necessaryto considerasset market incompleteness in
order to explain low cross-country consumption correlations. Previous examinations of
complete-market models suggest that it might be. However, the risk pooling in those models
representspecial cases in which aggregate consumption smoothing is the predominantmotive for
asset trade.
Inthemodel considered here,a simple form ofheterogeneity between agents implies that
changes in relativeendowments give rise to competing substitution effectsacross goods and
states. Ifthe elasticity ofsubstitution between domestic and imported goods is low relative to the
intertemporal orinter-state substitution elasticity, this trade-offcan result in low correlationsof
-2-aggregateconsumption acrosscountries. Infact, Ishow that outputcorrelations can exceed
consumption correlations in a model with completemarkets.
Themechanism underlyingtheseresults can be relatedto theanalysis ofFeeneyand Jones
(1994), in which the optimalallocations are shown to depend on two typesofrisk aversion:
aversiontoaggregate consumption risk and aversion to compositionalconsumption risk. Using
this terminology, the condition for low international consumption correlations can be stated as
requiringthat aversionto compositional riskto be sufficiently stronger than aversionto aggregate
consumption risk.
Animportant feature ofthe equilibrium dynamicsdescribed in this paper is that
consumption share allocations are state-contingent. This feature is associated with an important
allocative role forasset markets and it implies that an asset structureconsisting solely ofclaims to
(constant)shares ofthetwo goods will not support the optimal allocation. It will therefore be
useful to compare the heterogeneous-agent model to the “perfectlypooled equilibrium” construct
in which identical agents contractto divide goods endowments in constant proportions.2
2. ABasic Model
General Environment
The model consists oftwo countries, eachinhabited by an infinitely-lived representative agent.
Agents are endowed eachperiod with a stochastic quantity ofdistinct non-storable consumption
goods: The homeagent receives an endowmentXofgood x, while theforeign agent receives an
amount Yofgoody.
-3-Innovations to theendowmentsare drawnfrom ajoint log-normal distribution that is
symmetric in thesense that var(X)=var(Y)=a2 and cov(X,Y)=a,~.3Inthe analysisofdynamics to
follow, log-linearapproximations are expressed asproportional deviations from a baseline
equilibrium, definedby the nonstochastic equilibrium in which endowmentstake on their
(normalized)unconditional expected values, E[X]E[Y] 1.
Preferences
Both agents are assumed to be expected utility maximizers with preferences for aggregate
consumption over time and states ofthe form
V = E0{~13’U(C)] = ~ ~tfu(c)a’F(z)
where f3<1 is the agents’ (common) discountfactor and F(z,) is the distribution function for the
statevector; = (X~ Y). The home and foreign agents maximize over distinct aggregate
consumption measures C and C*, which are defined by the aggregator functions:
C1
= h(c~,c),() and C~= h *(C*C*)
Preferences are defined in terms ofthe nesting U(crcy)=u[h(cx,cy)] so as to distinguish between
substitution across goods (which depends on the parameters ofh and h *) from substitution across
statesortime (which depends on u).
Note that agentsare assumed to have identical discount factors, ~3, and aggregate utility
functions, u(.),but preferences over the composition ofbundles are allowed to differ, h(.) h*(.).
-4-In particular,thetypeofheterogeneity consideredwill be a ~tastebias” in favorofeither domestic
or imported goods.
Whiletheh and h* functions are presentedas preference specifications,they might also be
thoughtofas representing a productionstage (possibly home production) in which factors or
intermediate goods from eachcountryare combinedto producea final consumption good. Hence
theycan be interpretedbroadly as summarizing elementsofboth tastes and technology.
The h() and h*(.) functionsare assumed to be homothetic and symmetric in the sense that
h(x,y)=h*(y,x) for all (x,y). The elasticity ofsubstitution betweenXand Yi spresumed to be
approximately constant for“small” transitoryoutput fluctuations, sothe aggregator functions are
represented in CES form:
(1 —6) (1 —6) 1/(1 —6)
h(c~,c~) = [ac~ + (1-a)c~ }
h *(c~,c~) = [(1—a)c~’6~
+ ac)]
where the symmetry assumption dictatesthewayin which the share parameter a enters the
specifications. Note that heterogeneity is represented by a ½. The substitution parameter, ô
[O ô co],definestheelasticity ofsubstitution betweengoods as ho. The parameter0 is also the
coefficient ofrelativerisk aversionwith respect to compositional risk (Feeneyand Jones, 1994).
The functionu() is assumed to be ofthe CRRA form:
u(C,) = C1~/(1-y)
where y is the coefficient of(aggregate) relative risk aversion, and its inverse is theinter-state
orintertemporal elasticity ofsubstitution.
-5-Implications
Suppose that contingent-claimstrade begins simultaneously with the introductionofuncertaintyin
periodzero. The symmetryassumptions imposedon preferences and the endowment processes
insure that therelativegoods price under certaintywill be one and that the expected valueof
future endowmentstreamswillbe equal. Asa result, agents beginasset tradewith equal wealth.
When a&/2, identical preferences imply a “constant-share” equilibrium; i.e., optimal
allocations will consistofconstant shares ofthe endowments. Becausethe two agents begin with
equal wealth,the optimalcontract will allocate to each agent one-halfofeachendowment in all
states. This is theperfectlypooled equilibrium ofLucas (1982). Fora~½, the wealthdistribution
remains constant, but optimal allocation patternswill be more complex.
3. Risk Pooling and Consumption Dynamics
Optimization Problems
The complete-markets equilibrium can be found as the solution to a social planner’s problem, orto
a decentralized optimization problem with explicit contingent claims trade. Following thelatter
approach, the optimization problemsfaced by home and foreign agentscan be represented as the
maximiz~Jon ofagents’ preference functionssubject to resource constraints:
~f(q~(z1)[X(z1) —c~(z1)] —q~(z1)c~,(z1) }dz1=0 (1)
forthe homeagent, and
~ f(q~(z1)[Y(z1) -c)~(z1)] ~ (1*)
-6-forthe foreignagent. Assetpricesq~(z1) and q~(z1) denotethevalueofclaims to one unitofgoods
x andy in state; relative to the baseline price ofgoodx.
First order conditions fortheseproblems are:
ptU~(c~(z1),c~(z1))flz1) = A q~(z1) (2a)
= A~q~(z1) (2a*)
= A q~(z,) (2b)
Dtu;(c:(z1),c;(z1))1cz1) = A*q~(z1) (2b*)
where A (A*) represents thehome (foreign) marginal utility ofwealth. Asset market completeness
implies that equations(2)will hold over all states and dates.
Contingent claims prices q~(z1) and q~(z1)are equalizedacross countries, implying the
following fundamental relationship:
u ‘(C1)h~(c~,c~1) = u‘(C~h~(c~,c~) =
I **** I ****
u (C1 )h~ (c~,c~1) u (C1 )h~ (c,~,c~)
Inequation (3), p = A/A* is the (constant) ratioofLagrange multipliers on the agents’resource
constraints (the ratioofthe shadowvalues ofwealth). Inthe solutionto a social planners
problem, p would represent the ratioofwelfareweights (foreign/home) in the planner’s objective
function.
-7-Equilibrium also requiresthatthe followingaggregate consistencyconditions hold:
X1—c,~+c, (4a)
(4b)
The equilibrium solution will be a vectorofconsumptionsforeachindividual state and date,
[c~(z1)c~(z1)c~(;)c;(z1)1, which solves equations(3) and (4)for agiven wealth distribution,
p=A/A*.
With two margins ofsubstitutability and two margins oftrade(trade over both goods and
states) agentscan attain a full Pareto-optimum in which marginalutilities are adjusted
independently. Becauseagents are assumed to begin with equal wealth, XA*, and theratio p is
equal to one. Marginal utilities for eachgood therefore will be equalized across countries.
Approximate Dynamics
The systemofequations determiningequilibrium is highlynonlinear, so exact solutions are
generallyunavailable. To examinethe dynamic properties ofthe model, I derive log-linearized
versionsofthe first-orderconditions and find approximate solutions in termsofproportional
deviationsofvariables from theirbaseline certainty-equivalentvalues, e.g. = d[ln(X)] or
equivalently, X = dX/E{X}.
To highlight theeffects ofagent heterogeneity and theassociated departures from “perfect
pooling”, it is useful to find the equilibrium solutions in termsofconsumption shares, forexample
-8-s~=cJX, or = - ..t. Giventhe assumed functionalforms fortheu() andh() functions,
these solutions can be expressed as:
= (10)~[X 1] (5a)
= 0~[t - X] (5a*)
= 0Q[~ - 1’] (Sb)




Theparameter 0 is thehome agent’s consumption share ofthe x-good in the baseline
equilibrium (by symmetry, it is also the foreign country’s share ofthe y-good).4 Theterm (1-20)
in thenumerator offi measuresthe directionofthe bias in tastes, and 40(1~0)=[h_(1_20)2], which
appears in thedenominator ofü, is a measure ofthe intensityofthe bias.
Thecomposite term~ summarizes the allocational functionofasset trade, determining the
distributionofrelative consumption shares as a functionofthe realized state. Specifically,
~ =Q(~-19).
Note that(~ depends on both oftheelasticity orrisk-aversion parameters, y and 0. It can
therefore be interpreted either as a composite elasticity term orasa measure ofthetrade-off
between aggregate and compositional consumption risk.
-9-Aperfectly pooled equilibrium is associated with O=~½. Inthis caseQ0, sothat
consumption sharesare constant. For 0*1/; equations(5)show that shares move in proportionto
relative endowmentlevelsand that each agent’sshare allocations move in the same direction for
any givenrelative endowmentdeviation. The direction ofconsumption share deviations depend
on the sign ofQ. Forexample, a relatively highX-endowment is associated with an increase in
thehome agent’s consumption shares if~>O. The denominatorof~is always negative:
40(1-0)(O-y)-O = _(20_1)20 - 40(1-0)y <0
Therefore, () will be positive if:
(i.)0>’/~ and y<O,or
(ii.) 0<½ and y>O.
These conditions statethat: (i) agents consume moredomestic goods thanforeign goods
and compositional risk aversion is stronger than aggregate risk aversion, or (ii) agents consume
more imported goods and the risk aversion coefficientsobey an opposite inequality.
Note that Q equalszero not only when 0=Y2, but also wheny$. In this case, preferences over
the two goods are separable and a constant-share eauilibrium results eventhough preferences
differ.5 For each ofthetwo cases, asset markets play a limited allocational role: Risk is pooled
by distributing constant shares ofthe two endowments.
- 10 -Equations (5) canbe usedto express consumption movements directlyas:
= + (10)Q[.~t- fl (6a)
= + 0Q[i~ - ~] (6a*)
= )~÷0~[~ - (6b)
= Y + (1-0)~[Y- X] (6b*)
Aggregate consumption levels, C and C* canthen be expressed using linearized forms of
the aggregator (Ii) functions,
C = 0e~ + (I—O)e~ and ~ = (l_0)e~*+ 0ê
yielding:
C = [0~ + (1-0)1~+ 20(1-0)Qfk-PJ (7)
* = [(1 -0)X + 0J~+ 20(1-0)Q[2~-~] (7*)
Eachofthe expressions forconsumption allocations in (6)and (7) include two terms. The
first reflects thechangein consumption forfixed consumption shares, whilethe second captures
the effect ofchanges in relative share allocations summarized in equations (5).
When~0, the second terms in expressions (6) and (7) arezero. Individual consumptions
ofx-goods andy-goods move in direct proportion to world endowments and aretherefore
perfectly correlated across countries. For0=½, aggregate consumption levels also will be
-11-perfectlycorrelated. In theconstant-share equilibrium forseparable preferences (O=y), relative
share differences imply that theaggregate cross-country consumption correlationwill be less than
perfect.
A Diagrammatic Analysis
Becausethe equilibrium conditions imply equalityofmarginal utilities across countries, marginal
rates ofsubstitution will also be equal. (Ofcourse, this must be sobecause equilibrium
allocations clear both the asset and goods markets.) Accordingly, all allocations will lie on a
conventional goods-marketcontract curve, and an Edgeworth-box diagram can be a convenient
analytical tool forillustrating equilibrium dynamics.
Figure 1 presents diagramsfor threevaluesof0, drawnforthe special case in which the
h-functions areCobb-Douglas (&11). The Cobb-Douglas specification implies that when
consumption shares are constant, therelativeprice ofgoods moves in equal proportion to relative
endowment changes. For the purposeofcomparing perfectly-pooled allocations with the more
general contingent-claims market allocations, this feature provides a convenient benchmark. Each
panel in Figure 1 includestwo boxes: The first representsthe situation in thebaseline case
(X=Y=1), while the second is drawn fora particular state-realization in ~~hich X31 (X> 0).6
The top panel illustratesthe caseofidentical preferences. The contract curve is a straight
line connectingthe home and foreign origins, 0 and 0*, and the Cobb-Douglas assumption
implies that the relative price changes in proportionto the endowmentchange. The equilibrium
allocation in both boxesreflect the perfect pooling natureofthis case, with each agent consuming
halfofthe endowment ofeach good (shown in the left box as pointE°and in the right box as E).
- 12 -The middlepanel illustratesa casein which 0>V2. The equilibrium pointE reflects the
baseline consumption shares 0 and (1-0). Inthe right-handbox, pointE corresponds to the
constant-share equilibrium associated with y=.O. For y<O equations (5)imply an increase in the
homeagents consumption shares, as illustrated by allocation E’, For y>O, thehome agent’s
consumption sharesfailrelative to the constant-share allocation (to E’).
The lower panel depicts the 0<’i’2 case. It is essentiallya mirror imageofthe 0>’/2 case,
with y’z0 implying a decline in the home agent’s consumption shares(to E’) and y>O implying an
increase (to E”).
Optimal Allocations and Risk Aversion
Theconsumption share movements illustrated in the middle and lower panels ofFigure 1 depend
upon the relativevaluesoftheparameters y and 0, reflecting atradeoffbetween substitution
across goods and substitution across states ortime. This tradeoffcan also be expressed in terms
oftwo types ofrisk aversion: aggregate and compositional risk.
While the relationship betweenaggregate risk aversion and intertemporal or interstate
substitution is fairlystandard, the notion ofcompositional risk aversion is not widely used. As
described in Feeney and Jones(1994), however, theconcept is directly analogousto the
conventional notionofriskaversion. For example, suppose an agentreceives an endowment
which fluctuatesrandomly between two bundles, one consisting ofmorex thany and the other of
morey than x. Even ifboth bundles lie on the same indifference curve, the agent would be willing
to pay a premium to consume a convex combination ofthetwo bundles with certainty.
- 13 -Theimportanceofcompositional risk aversion canbe demonstrated by considering
expected utility. Takingtheexpected value ofa second-orderTaylor series expansion ofU(c~ c~3,)
around thebaseline consumption point,
E[U(c~,c)]—U(0,1—0) + !U~(0,1—0)var(c) + UX)(0,1—0)cov(cX,cY) + !U~,(0,1—0)var(c~
After substituting parametersand expressing second moments in terms oftheir log-linear
approximations [e.g. var(c~)=02var(ê~)J, expected utility (relativeto the certainty baseline) canbe
approximated as:
E[U(c,c)} - U(0,1-0)
(1-y)U(0,1 0) _.~{02var(êx)+ 20(1—0)cov(ê~,ê~) + (1-0)2var(ê~)}
00(1-0)
+ 2 {2cov(c~,c~) — var(c~)— var(c~) }
= _!{yvar(~j) + 00(1—0)var(ê — e~) (8)
From equation (8), it is clear that thewelfare implicationsofinternational asset trade
depend not only on the abilityofagents to smooth aggregate consumption variability, but also on
their ability to smooth variability in the composition ofconsumption bundles, as represented here
by the (cJc~)-ratio.
To provide a more intuitive explanationofthis notion, Figure 2 reproducesthe situation in
themiddle panelofFigure 1, focusing on the home agent’s utility. Whenthetwo substitution
elasticitiesor risk aversionterms are equal (y=O), constantconsumption shares imply movement
from equilibriumE°to F, which is associated with a fall in the (cJc~)-ratio -- as indicated by the
- 14 -slope oftheray OErelativeto OF°— and an increase in aggregate consumption — as indicated by
themovementfrom indifference curveU°to U.
When agents are relatively moreaverse to compositional consumption risk than to
aggregate consumption risk (y>O), they are more willing to accommodate largechanges in C and
relatively less willing to alter thecomposition ofconsumption. This situation is illustrated by
equilibrium E’, which is associated with a fairly small change in the(cJc~)-ratio [to ray OF’], and
a relatively largechange in aggregate consumption [to U’]. When the relative magnitudes of
risk-aversionterms is reversed, agents are more willing to alter the compositionofconsumption
[a largechange in (c)c~) to ray OF”] and less willing to experience changes in aggregate
consumption over states[a smaller changein utility fromU°to U”].
4. Cross-Country Consumption Correlations
Sufficient Conditions: An Example
A simple case that can serve to illustrate sufficient conditions forcross-country consumption
correlationsto be lower thanoutput correlations is one in whichXand Yareuncorrelated. The
consumption correlationwill be lower thanthe output correlation iftheformer is negative; that is,
ifC ~ndC* move in opposite directions in response to a change in reh~ve endowments.
Consider a positive x-endowment shock(the casewhere) 0>Y2. When y<O the home
country’s consumption sharesrise relativeto the baseline, while the foreign agent’s consumption
shares fall. The sufficient condition forcorr(C,C*)<0 will be satisfiedifthe fall in the foreigner’s
shares is large enough that foreign aggregate consumption falls. For 0<½, a similar situation
- 15 -couldarisein whichthe homeagent’saggregate consumption falls in responseto a positive
x-endowment (a complete-markets analog to immizerizing growth).
From equations(7), itcan be determinedthat thesepatterns will occurwhen [1-20~]<0
or [1+2(1-0)U}<0. Intermsoftheunderlying parameters,
[1 - 20~]<0 y < 20-1 (9a)
or,
[1 + 2(1 ~ 0 2(1-0) (9b)
Figure 3 uses a representationoftheparameterspace to illustrate these regions. Two
importantfeaturesoftheregions are(i.) the elasticity ofsubstitution across goods must be less
than one-halftheintertemporal substitution elasticity and (ii.)preferences must be skewed away
from thecase ofidentical utility.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
These conditions are necessaryaswell as sufficient: Thatis, allowing fornon-zero covariance of
Xand Ychanges the consumption corre1~’tion, but does not change the relativemagnitudesofthe
consumption and output correlation. Usingequations (7), explicit expressionsfor
var(C)=var(~ *) and cov(O,~ ~)canbe derived:
var(~)= var(C~) =( 1-K) o2 + K
cov(C,C ) = K ~2 + (1 -K) o,,,
- 16 -wherea2=varc~)=var(cr),a~,=cov(~ 2), and theparameterK is a functionofthe underlyingshare
and elasticity parameters: K=20(1-0)[1+2(1-0)~][h-20~]. The cross countryconsumption
correlation canthenbe expressed as:
~* ) = cov(O,O ~) = K + (1-K) corr(XM (10)
var(C) (1-K) + K corr(X,1’)
It is straightforward to show from (10)that corr(C,C )<corr(X,F) whenever one ofconditions
(9a) or (9b) hold.
To illustrate therelationshipbetweenthe consumption and outputcorrelations somewhat
more quantitatively, Table 2 reports theconsumption correlations associated with a range of
elasticity and share parameter values,assuming that thecross-country output correlation is 0.6.
Again, the important featuresdistinguishing the cases where corr(O,~ *)~corr(X,Y)arethat the
preferences are not identical (0#½) and that aversion to compositional risk significantly exceeds
aversionto aggregate risk y/O<<½.Notice that forany relativeshare distribution, 0, the
consumption correlation is monotonically increasing in y/O: as aggregate consumption risk
becomes more important relative to compositional risk, consumption-smoothing predominates.7
Risk Neutrality and theRvbczynski Effect
Theexample described above canbe related to a familiar result from trade theory: theRybczynski
effect. In Figure 2, the point at which ray OF°intersects the contract curve represents an upper
bound on the rise in the home agent’s consumption shares(the fall in theforeign agents’ shares),
- 17 -and correspondsto aggregate risk neutrality(y=O). That is,ü is maximized at Q = 11(20-1).
Note that this solution is independent of0; In the absenceofaggregate risk aversion,
compositional risk is fully pooledby asset trade. In this casethe(cjc~)-ratio is constant and will
be associated with a constant relativegoods price.
This situation is analagousto a casewhere thetwo countriesare “small”,facing an
exogenous world relativeprice. Consequently, an increase in the endowmentofXleadsto an
absoluteincrease in the consumption oftheagent who consumes thex-good intensively -- and an
absolute decline in the consumption ofthe otheragent.
More generally,this typeofmodel is equivalentto a two-by-two(two factors,two goods)
closed-economy general equilibrium production model. Commodities C and C* areproduced
using factorsXand Y. Optimal allocations and relative price movements aredetermined by factor
intensities and substitutability in production (the h-functions) and preferences (the social planner’s
weighted averageofu and u*).S
5. Discussion and Conclusions
The model in this paper has illustrated a setting in which asset marketsplay an allocational role
which goesbeyond simple consumption smoothing. In that context, Ihave shown that complete
asset markets can be associated with cross-country consumption correlations that arelower than
cross-country output correlations. The conditions forthis phenomenon can be described as
requiring that the aversion to compositional consumption risk be sufficiently stronger than
aversion to aggregate consumption risk. Whenthis is so, agentsuse international asset trade to
- 18 -smooth thecompositionoftheirconsumption bundles, allowing greater variability in aggregate
consumption.
A natural question which arises from this analysis is: How realistic arethese conditions?
Clearly, thehomogeneous-agent implication that import sharesare equal to one-halfis unrealistic.
Importshares ofnational income have averaged only about 15% in theUnited States, Europe and
Japan over the lastdecade (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland 1992a). The import contentoffinal
consumption goods is even lower (Clarida, 1991). The analysis in this paperhas modeled these
import shares in a very simple way, as parameters ofa utility function.
The plausibility oftheelasticity restrictions aremore difficultto evaluate. The
intertemporal elasticity ofsubstitution hasbeen subject to a wide rangeofestimates. Citing
estimates from time-seriesanalyses, most dynamic general equilibrium models are calibrated with
a value ofy between 0.5 and 2.0. Hall (1988),and Campbell and Mankiw (1989) foundthat the
intertemporal substitution elasticity is close to zero. However, using a preference specification
which is designed to disentangle risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability, Epstein and Zin
(1991) found that while theintertemporal elasticity is significantly less thanone, the coefficient of
relativerisk aversion is close to one. In thecontext examined in this paper, asset tradeis used to
pool riskacross states, with allocations depen~nt on risk aversion. Anappropriatevalue fory of
betweenzero and one does not seemcompletely unreasonable.
Even with alow value fory, theconditions derived in this paperrequire a high degree of
compositional risk aversion, ora very low elasticity ofsubstitution between domestic and
imported goods. There exists a largebody ofliterature measuring import demand and export
supply elasticities (e.g., Stern, Francis and Schumacher,1976). This work suggests an elasticity in
- 19 -the rangeofone to two. However, these studies are highlydisaggregated. The empirical
counterparts to theconsumption and output measures ofthis model consist ofbundles ofgoods:
sometypes ofgoods maybe veryclose substitutes, other are highlydifferentiated, some are
non-traded, some aresubject to distortions, etc. The relevant elasticity ofsubstitution to consider
is not a pure preferenceortechnologicalparameter, but a composite that reflects anumberof
factors. The appropriateelasticity might be considerably lower thanthe measured substitutability
ofcategorized, traded goods.
For example,the general condition oflow aggregate risk aversionrelativeto
compositional risk aversion is also present in the models ofStockman and Tesar (1995)and Tesar
(1993), in which low substitutability betweentraded goods and nontradedgoods drives downthe
aggregate cross-country consumption correlation.
Interpreting themodel in thesebroad terms, theexplanation forthe consumption-output
correlation described here is not being advanced asthe “solution” to this “puzzle”. Rather, this
paper illustrates ageneral class ofconditions under which completemarkets can be associated
with low cross-country consumption correlations.
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- 24 -Notes
1. The importanceofthis stylized facthasbeen emphasized by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1992b, 1993). Although the relationshipbetween consumption and output correlations may not
be as robust as is often suggested [e.g., theresults reported in Tesar(1993) and Pakko (1994)], it
doescharacterizethe relationshipwhich holds for many bilateral country comparisons
(particularly among industrial countries), and is treated in this paper as the relevant criterion for
matching theory to data.
2. Aperfectly pooled equilibrium is often explicitly assumed in equilibrium exchange rate models
[e.g., Svensson (1985), and Stockman and Svensson (1987)] and in analyses oftheforward
exchange premium [e.g., Hodrick (1989)1. Even in models which literally depart from perfect
pooling [e.g., Stockman and Dellas (1989), Stockman and Tesar (1995)] some vestige ofperfect
pooling is often retained.
3. Anytemporal dependence in the endowment distributions will be irrelevant for theanalysis of
this paper. Trade in contingent claims over all dates and the nonstorability endowmentsimply a
complete time-separability in the maximization problems.
4. The parameter 0 is a function ofa, 0 and the steady state consumption levels; specifically,
0 = ac~~’~/ [a ~ + (1—a) C~’~~]
- 25 -5. The sign ofQ is associated with the sign ofthe cross-derivativeoftheutilityfunction, LT~,,.
When O=y, U~=Oand the utilityfunction reducesto the separable form:
u[h(c~,c~)] =[a ~ + (1—a) ~ ]/(l-y).
6. Figure 1 is similar to diagrams used by Hagiwara (1994) to illustrate terms oftradevariability
in a model with the sametype ofheterogeneity considered here. She shows that the terms of
trade are more variable forheterogeneity than foridentical preferences when y/O>l.
7. Inorder to verit~’ that the log-linearapproximated solutions do not give misleading results,
numerical simulations were conducted using the exact non-linear solutions. Using a standard
deviation forX and Y equal to that ofU.S. output, the simulated results for consumption
correlations yeilded no cases in which there was a statistically significantly difference from the
figures reportedin Table 2.
8. This typeofanalogybetweensocial welfare analysis and production activity analysis is
explored in Jones (1972).
1
- 26 -Counlr’
HP-Filtered Data First-Differeneed Data
Consumption Output Consumption Output
Austria .18 .23 .03 .08
Canada .58 .72 .35 .48
Gennany .26 .36 .21 .30
Japan .26 .17 .27 .18
Spain .10 .25 .10 .16
Switzerland .35 .37 .11 .16
U.K. .44 .58 .16 .21
¶lThedata in Table 1 are real private consumption expenditures andreal grossdomesticproduct, seasonally
adjusted. Theywere obtainedfrom theOECD quartelynational accounts tape. The sample periods are as
follows: Canada, Japan andtheU.K. 1995Q1-l993Q4; Austria 1959Q3-1993Q4; West Germany I968Q I -
l993Q4; France, Spain, andSwitzerland l9lOQl-1993Q4.
Table 1: Correlations ofConsumption and Output with the U.S.aY/ö
Domestic Consumption Share (0)
.50 .60 .70 .80 .90
4 1.0000 .9987 .9936 .979 1 .9287
2 1.0000 .9948 .9766 .9352 .8408
1 1.0000 .9802 .9231 .8349 .7241
~/2 1.0000 .9287 .7875 .6741 .6165
1/3 1.0000 .8567 .6575 .5701* .5662*
Y4 1.0000 .7738 .5478* .5006* .5382*
1/8 1.0000 .4382* .2742* .3284* .4914*
~Enfriesin Table I represent thecross-countryconsumption correlations for the givenparameters. The
cross-countryoutputcorrelation is setto .60. Entries marked with an asterisk (*) are values for whichthe
consumptioncorrelation islowerthanthe outputcorrelation.









































Figure 3. Parameter Values Associated With Corr(C,C*)<Con(X,Y)